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Since 1989, international efforts to end protracted conflicts in Africa, Latin America, and 
Asia have included sustained investments in the disarmament, demobilization, and 
reintegration (DDR) of combatants from the warring parties.  Yet, while policy analysts have 
debated the organizational factors that contribute to a successful DDR program, little is 
known about the factors that account for successful DDR at the micro level.  Using a new 
dataset of ex-combatants in Sierra Leone, this paper analyzes, for the first time, the 
individual level determinants of demobilization and reintegration.  Conventional views about 
the importance of age and gender for understanding reintegration find little support in the 
data.  Instead, we find that an individual’s prospect of gaining acceptance from family and 
neighbors depends largely on the abusiveness of the unit in which he or she fought.  Finally, 
while internationally-funded programs designed to assist the demobilization and 
reintegration process may have had an effect at the macro-level, we find no evidence that 
those who participated in DDR programs had an easier time gaining acceptance from their 






























Disentangling the Determinants of Successful  






Department of Political Science 
Columbia University 
420 West 118th St. 
New York, NY 10027 
mh2245@columbia.edu 
 
Jeremy M. Weinstein 
Assistant Professor 
Department of Political Science 
Encina Hall West, Room 100 
Stanford University 







                                                 
1 Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC, 2005.  This 
research draws on a large survey led by the authors together with the Post-conflict Reintegration Initiative for 
Development and Empowerment (PRIDE) in Freetown, Sierra Leone.  Financial support was provided by the Earth 
Institute at Columbia University, and logistical support came from the Demobilization and Reintegration office at the 
United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL). We are particularly grateful to Alison Giffen and Richard 
Haselwood for their extensive work on this project, to Christina Cacioppo and Daniel Butler for research assistance, to 
Allan Quee, Patrick Amara and Lawrence Sessay, our partners in the field at PRIDE, and to Desmond Molloy at 
UNAMSIL.  We also wish to thank participants in seminars at the University of California, San Diego and Yale 
University for helpful comments on previous versions of this paper.     3
I.  Introduction 
 
  Since 1989, international efforts to end protracted conflicts in Africa, Latin America, and 
Asia have included sustained investments in the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration 
(DDR) of combatants from the warring parties.  Many of these programs have been part of 
comprehensive political settlements, negotiated and agreed to under the watchful eye of 
international observers after years of inconclusive fighting.  Other demobilization efforts have been 
led by governments victorious in civil war.  In a small number of instances, outside actors have 
employed coercive means to facilitate disarmament and the reestablishment of security.  Yet across 
all these cases, the basic purpose of DDR has been clear: to reestablish a legitimate monopoly over 
the use of force by the government and return former fighters to civilian activities (Berdal 1996). 
 
  Formal programs to facilitate DDR date back to the operations of the United 
Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA) in 1989.  Since then, DDR has 
figured prominently as part of UN operations in El Salvador, Cambodia, Mozambique, 
Angola, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guatemala, Tajikistan, and Burundi, to name a few.  By 2000, 
when the Secretary General was asked to report to the Security Council on the role of the 
UN in DDR efforts, he felt confident enough to conclude that DDR has “a process of 
disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration has repeatedly proved to be vital to stability in a 
post-conflict situation”  (United Nations 2000, emphasis added). 
 
  This certainty among policymakers about the need for disarmament, demobilization, and 
reintegration efforts after civil conflict should not blind us to the difficulty of the task at hand.  In 
post-conflict situations, following years of fighting between warring parties, distrust and uncertainty 
are rife.  Disarmament efforts, which aim to remove the means by which the war was fought, also 
leave factions and combatants vulnerable, without the weapons they would need to protect 
themselves if the other side reneges on an agreement.  Demobilization represents the formal 
disbanding of military organizations – a process that strips combatants of the prestige, comradeship, 
and economic opportunities that may have been channeled through their participation in the 
fighting.  Losing those ties can be profoundly threatening to ex-combatants.  Reintegration 
programs often thrust largely illiterate soldiers back into communities that suffered enormous 
violence during the fighting.  Without skills and isolated from social networks, combatants face an 
uphill battle in reestablishing a non-military way of life. 
 
     While policymakers recognize that DDR is fraught with complexity, few systematic efforts 
have been launched to evaluate the determinants of successful reintegration by ex-combatants after 
conflict.  The literature is chock full of ‘lessons-learned’ assessments which attempt to parse the 
factors that account for the success (or failure) of a given DDR program.  But this debate has been 
carried out in the absence of micro-level data that can reveal why, at the individual level, 
demobilization and reintegration is successful.  To our knowledge, no rigorous attempt has been 
made to identify factors that might explain why some individuals and not others are able to 
successfully reintegrate after conflict.   
 
  Focusing on demobilization and especially reintegration, we argue in this paper for a 
reframing of the question.  Efforts to assess the impact of DDR require a source of variation in the 
use of DDR programs.  At the macro-level, this can be achieved by comparing countries that did or 
did not have DDR programs.  At the micro-level, this can be achieved by comparing individuals that 
did and did not participate in DDR programs.  Does DDR work for individual i in country X?    4
What explains whether individuals are able to demobilize and reintegrate into society after war?  To 
what extent does participation in internationally-funded DDR programs impact the likelihood of 
reintegration?  We address these questions using results from a systematic survey of ex-combatants 
representing the five warring factions in Sierra Leone’s civil war. 
 
  Sierra Leone’s DDR process is widely regarded as a success story, and elements of the Sierra 
Leone ‘model’ are being replicated in neighboring Liberia, in Burundi, and now as far away as Haiti 
(World Bank 2003).  Our empirical evidence largely validates this story of success.  More than 
70,000 fighters – 89% of the total pool of ex-combatants – were demobilized by the international 
community and peace has been maintained in the four years since the war came to an end.  
Participation rates in the DDR program were high and nearly equal across the five major factions, 
and there is little evidence that an individual’s political affiliation is associated with his or her 
ultimate satisfaction with the program.  Complaints about the program centered mainly on its 
administrative efficiency and bureaucratic design – common criticisms of UN-sponsored programs, 
but not evidence of a politically-manipulated process.    
 
  Success at the macro-level does not mean, however, that no variation existed at the micro-
level.  Our estimates suggest that at least six percent of fighters experienced severe problems – in 
gaining acceptance, finding employment, and accepting the democratic process – after the 
demobilization and reintegration process concluded.
2  From a substantive point of view, this 
estimated pool of nearly 5000 struggling fighters is no small matter.  For a civilian population that 
bore the brunt of a war initiated by less than 200 fighters, the failure to reintegrate thousands of ex-
combatants may represent a threat to continued stability that cannot be ignored.  From a 
methodological point of view, this variation provides a key to working out what works in DDR and 
why.  In particular, if the macro effects of DDR programs work through the positive effects they 
have on individual combatants, and if participants and non-participants in DDR programs are 
otherwise similar (a point we return to below), then we should be able to observe evidence 
indicating the success of these programs at the micro-level.  In such cases, a lack of variation in 
reintegration success across participants and non-participants (which we find in Sierra Leone), would 
be inconsistent with the claim that DDR programs are responsible for the macro-level outcomes.  
 
  In exploring why some fighters successfully reintegrated while others did not, we examine 
reintegration along multiple dimensions – whether combatants have been accepted by their families 
and communities, obtained employment, rejected their faction as a political actor, and accepted the 
democratic process – but highlight the degree of acceptance as a key indicator of a combatant’s 
long-term prospects.  We first explore individual-level, group level, and community-level 
determinants of reintegration success that should figure in the design and implementation of DDR 
programs.  Then we turn to an examination of those interventions specifically designed to ease 
reintegration – the use of stop gap programs (road-building, infrastructure, etc.), the deployment of 
peacekeeping troops and the DDR program itself.  
 
  Our analysis of reintegration success finds that, contrary to conventional wisdom, there is 
little evidence that women or young people faced a significantly harder time gaining acceptance into 
civilian life after conflict.  Instead, the most important determinant of whether an individual was 
accepted by his family and his community is the abusiveness of the unit in which he or she fought.  
Proxies for the level of abuse perpetrated by an individual’s unit are strongly associated with 
                                                 
2 The margin of error for this estimate (with 95% confidence) is plus or minus 1.9%.     5
problems in gaining acceptance, even controlling for unobserved attributes correlated with 
membership in the different factions.  In addition, there is weak evidence that individuals who settle 
in communities that suffered high levels of abuse during the war encounter more difficulty in 
gaining acceptance from family and friends.   
 
  Surprisingly, we also find that the multiple dimensions of reintegration are not highly 
correlated with one another.  It does not appear that combatants who have given up their guns and 
broken away from their factions, will also find acceptance in their communities and embrace the 
post-war political process.  Different logics seem to drive the processes of gaining acceptance, 
finding employment, breaking away from one’s faction, and gaining confidence in the democratic 
process. 
 
  Finally, in our study of program effects, we find little evidence that participation in the DDR 
program increases the likelihood that combatants will gain acceptance from their families and 
communities in the aftermath of fighting.  Non-participants do just as well in the post-war period as 
participants, controlling for other major determinants of an individual’s prospects.  We examine 
three possible explanations for this finding.  The simplest explanation is that participation in DDR 
had no impact on reintegration: the programs happened to exist in a climate where other features 
facilitated reintegration.  A second is that effects on individuals are masked by a selection effect: the 
DDR program may have incorporated those fighters that would have had the greatest difficulty 
reintegrating.  Finally, it is possible that the impact of DDR is dispersed: even non-participants may 
benefit through spillovers from the programs.  We find little or no support for the second and third 
stories, reinforcing our confidence in our finding.  In Sierra Leone, the DDR program may have 
been only one small part of a larger peace-making and peace-building effort that ended the war and 
eased reintegration regardless of whether individuals themselves participated in the demobilization.   
 
  The next section of this paper situates demobilization and reintegration in the context of 
existing theoretical arguments about the determinants of successful peace-building.  The third 
section reviews recent work that evaluates the impact of DDR programs at the macro-level.  A 
fourth section introduces the case of Sierra Leone and describes our research method.  The fifth and 
sixth sections describe our empirical strategy for studying the determinants of reintegration success 
and identifying the effects of international programs.  A conclusion discusses the relevance of our 
results for broader discussions of DDR and post-conflict strategy. 
  
II.  DDR in the Transition from War to Peace 
 
  International peace-building is now considered a critical instrument of the international 
community for addressing countries in conflict (Doyle and Sambanis 2000).  In the 1990s, from 
Somalia to Haiti and Cambodia to Liberia, the international community has invested significant 
resources in efforts to bring conflicts to an end and reduce the likelihood that they will recur.  
Investments in the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of combatants have been 
fundamental to the United Nations’ growing role in post-conflict situations. 
 
  The United Nations defines the demobilization and reintegration aspects of DDR as follows 
(United Nations 2000): 
 
(a)  Demobilization refers to the process by which parties to a conflict begin to disband their 
military structures and combatants begin the transformation into civilian life.  It generally   6
entails registration of former combatants; some kind of assistance to enable them to 
meet their immediate basic needs; discharge, and transportation to their come 
communities.  It may be followed by recruitment into a new, unified military force. 
 
(b) Reintegration refers to the process which allows ex-combatants and their families to 
adapt, economically and socially, to productive civilian life.  It generally entails the 
provision of a package of cash or in-kind compensation, training, and job- and income-
generating projects. 
 
  While much of the literature on DDR is practical – outlining how programs should be 
designed and implemented – the demobilization of armed factions occupies a central place in 
theories of civil war termination and post-conflict peace-building as well.  In particular, the literature 
helps us identify what successful DDR should look like in terms of changing patterns of behavior 
on-the-ground.    
 
  The literature on civil war termination suggests that adversaries in post-conflict 
environments face a security dilemma (Walter 1997).  Civil war is characterized by an anarchical 
environment – no government exists to ensure order, no judicial system enforces contracts, and 
groups are divided into independent, armed camps.  But signing a peace agreement to end the war 
does little to address the core security dilemma that exists in a state of anarchy.  A peace agreement 
requires that armed factions demobilize their forces, yet those forces are the only thing that stands in 
the way of their defeat by an adversary.  In one statement of this argument, Walter claims that “any 
attempt to end a civil war and unify the country also eliminates any ability to enforce and secure the 
peace.”  (Walter 1997, p. 338)  The implication is that warring factions cannot be expected to 
disarm, demobilize, and disengage their military forces when no legitimate institutions exist to 
enforce the contract.  A solution to this dilemma is a credible third-party guarantee – an outside 
actor that monitors the terms of the peace agreement, verifies the actions taken by each side, and 
sanctions violations with force if necessary.  Third-party enforcers can offer assurances that warring 
factions will be protected, terms will be fulfilled, and promises will be kept (at least as long as they 
exert some authority in the post-conflict environment).  With external enforcement, cheating 
becomes difficult and costly, and the payoffs to implementing a peace agreement rise.   
 
  This literature thus identifies a critical role for external actors in enabling the reciprocal 
demobilization of competing forces at the end of a conflict.  External intervention is associated with 
a more stable peace, in part, because it provides an environment in which warring partners can 
dismantle their structures of command-and-control. 
 
  Other research on civil war resolution focuses on spoilers (Stedman 1997).  Spoilers are, 
“leaders and parties who believe that peace emerging from negotiations threatens their power, 
worldview and interests, and use violence to undermine attempts at achieving it.” (Stedman 1997, p. 
5)  If not properly engaged, spoilers can destroy negotiated settlements, plunging countries back into 
civil war. Spoilers come in many shapes and sizes; differences in their motivations and goals dictate 
the types of strategies international actors might employ to bring them to the table.  In particular, 
three types merit special consideration: limited spoilers who advance concrete goals, total spoilers 
who will reject the process regardless of the benefits and costs, and greedy spoilers whose goals can 
be affected by calculations about the likelihood of realizing gains or losses.  Total spoilers, by 
definition, cannot be accommodated, but limited and greedy spoilers can be managed during the 
peace process.  In particular, Stedman identifies a strategy of inducement in which positive measures   7
can be taken to address the grievances of factions who stand in the way of peace.  Demands may 
include greater protection, greater benefits, or legitimization as part of the peace process.   
 
  Increasingly, DDR programs are one of the key inducements used by international actors to 
manage spoilers in post-conflict situations.  The design of demobilization efforts offers a host of 
carrots (and some sticks) outsiders can employ.  Reintegration packages and training programs 
enable leaders to deliver concrete benefits to combatants at the conclusion of the fighting, some of 
which can be designed to address underlying grievances that gave rise to the conflict.  The process 
itself provides a mechanism to legitimize the warring factions (or exclude them), and engages the 
leadership of the armed groups in both program design and implementation.  Thus, DDR can play a 
key role in neutralizing spoilers—and thereby promoting peace.   
 
  A third insight of the war termination literature is that institutional redesign in the peace 
agreement may provide a channel through which warring parties can send costly signals of their 
commitment to a permanent settlement (Hoddie and Hartzell 2003).  In particular, parties can agree 
to participate in new institutions with potentially high costs to themselves, helping them to 
overcome the distrust that exists in the post-war period.  Possibilities include the integration of 
armed forces from competing factions, the appointment of key military officers from formerly 
adversarial groups into the same hierarchy, and perhaps provisions that allow groups to maintain 
small forces for a set period of time.  Walter offers a broader view of institutional reconfiguration 
that envisions groups committing to power-sharing arrangements (such as a decentralized form of 
federalism).  These new arrangements might address concerns of political elimination and could 
increase parties’ buy-in to the political process (Walter 1999).  Thus DDR programs also contribute 
to post-war stability by incorporating formerly opposing groups into new, unified political and 
military structures.  Successful DDR will likely be characterized then by signals of buy-in from ex-
combatants themselves to the new political and social order.  
  
  A brief look at the war termination literature points to a critical, yet implicit role for 
disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration in the resolution of civil conflict.  It suggests three 
aspects of successful reintegration that are measurable and believed to be linked to a stable post-war 
political order: (1) the breaking down of command, control, and capacity in the warring factions; (2) 
the reintegration of ex-combatants into the economy and community life and; (3) the development 
of a political and military structure that gives combatants a stake in the future of the country (and 
allows them to signal their commitment to peace).  In section five, we use these three related 
concepts to develop multiple measures of reintegration success for Sierra Leone. 
 
  What this literature does not offer, however, is significant traction on the factors that may 
account for successful reintegration at the level of individual combatants.  The mechanisms linking 
DDR programs to successful peacebuilding are hypothesized to operate largely at the macro-level.  
For a given conflict, it is the presence of outside actors, the use of inducements, and the institution 
of power-sharing arrangements that are believed to contribute to sustainable conflict resolution.  Of 
course, we can explore the micro-level corollaries to these macro-level theories.  For example, we 
can gain some leverage on the impact of DDR as an inducement to reintegration by comparing the 
post-war trajectories of participants and non-participants in DDR.  In addition, the scale and scope 
of external presence is something that varies across geographic areas and over time.  We can explore 
whether variation in the external troop presence is correlated with successful reintegration.  But the 
theories outlined above do not explicitly address the micro-level processes through which 
peacebuilding is achieved.  In fact, our review of the literature yields little in the way of systematic   8
theories about the conditions under which combatants will give up their arms and reintegrate into 
civilian life in the aftermath of war.  Our primary purpose in this paper is thus empirical: to 
document the factors that account for successful reintegration across individual combatants.   
 
III.  Past Attempts to Evaluate DDR Programs 
 
  With more than a decade of UN experiences in DDR, there has been no shortage of 
attempts by policy analysts and practitioners to cull the lessons learned from various processes of 
implementation around the globe.  The optimal way to identify program effectiveness is to identify a 
control group using a method of “randomized intervention.”   
  
  The process of randomized intervention works as follows: if there are 100 people that will 
receive some treatment and 200 people who are eligible to receive the treatment, then 100 people 
are chosen randomly from the group of 200 eligible people and assigned the treatment.  All 200 
people, however, are tracked.  The fact that the 100 are chosen randomly means that there is no 
systematic difference between those that did and those that did not receive the treatment – the only 
systematic difference lies in the treatment itself.  While individuals and communities differ from one 
another for a range of reasons, the purpose of evaluation is to identify the systematic effects of 
DDR.  Randomized intervention provides enormous power for understanding the impacts of 
interventions.  It may be the only realistic strategy to get at key questions on which policy 
practitioners in DDR have yet to come to consensus: whether benefits should be targeted to 
individuals or communities, to what extent special groups (women and children) should be included 
in the process, and what forms of training are linked to future economic success.   
 
  While some experts within the United Nations have taken interest in and debated the 
feasibility of employing randomized intervention, this approach has not yet been used in practice.  
The idea is still new and UN staff with the ultimate responsibility for implementing programs in 
post-conflict environments are cautious about altering the structure of programs which are highly 
political and sensitive, in order to allow for better evaluation, even though there are multiple aspects 
of DDR over which there is considerable uncertainty.  To date, we know of no attempt to employ 
the principle of randomization in evaluating the impact of DDR.  The result is that, despite the cost 
of these programs, our knowledge about whether these programs actually work is very limited.  
 
  The evaluations that have been undertaken divide into three categories: lessons that emerge 
from dialogues among policy experts, from cross-country comparisons of program design, and from 
the outside evaluation of specific DDR programs.  Dialogues among policymakers and practitioners 
have produced a number of lessons drawn from retrospective evaluation of the successes and 
failures of individual DDR programs.  Workshops of this type have been hosted by UN agencies, 
U.S. government departments, and research think-tanks including the Institute for Security Studies 
in South Africa and the International Peace Academy.  A recent volume bringing together the 
diverse insights of practitioners and researchers offers six lessons learned that ought to guide the 
design and implementation of DDR efforts (Meek and Malan 2004).  These include the need for 
integrated planning from the earliest stages; a focus on prioritizing and linking reintegration more 
fully to disarmament and demobilization; efforts to employ a regional approach, recognizing that 
borders do not constrain conflicts; clear and articulated objectives for the DDR program; active 
efforts to manage the expectations of ex-combatants; and attention to the inequities DDR programs 
create between combatants and community members.  Evaluations of this type aim to illuminate 
processes of program design and implementation hypothesized to matter for the successful   9
demobilization of armed forces.  The focus is on identifying how better to organize and design 
programs, by drawing on the constraints and difficulties faced by practitioners in different contexts.  
Strikingly however, little attention is paid to the measurement of success, by comparing the success 
rates among participants and non-participants either at the country or at the individual level. 
 
  A second approach employs cross-country comparisons of program implementation in an 
effort to extract those factors that account for the success or failure of DDR programs.  Perhaps the 
most well-known work in this area has been produced by the World Bank, which sought to make 
sense of its involvement in military demobilization by comparing program experiences in seven 
countries (World Bank 1993).  The World Bank authors advance a series of measurable outcomes 
linked to four aspects of success for a DDR program: security, political, economic, and fiscal.  For 
example, on the security front, the authors argue that success might be measured by looking for a 
reduction in the number of guns circulating, the dispersal of ex-combatants, the resumption of 
normal economic activity, and a decline in civilian violence, among other indicators.  These 
measures are focused on outcomes, but only at the national level.  The comparative study comes up 
short, however, in its efforts to isolate the factors that account for success or failure across the 
different programs.  As in the studies described above, attention is paid almost entirely to issues of 
program design (such as the extent of involvement of veterans in program management, for 
example).  The study hints at some deeper variables of causal importance, including whether or not 
DDR programs are implemented in an environment in which political and economic agreements 
among ex-combatants have already been forged ahead of time.  Looking ahead, the authors argue 
for more sustained data collection at the individual level that would allow for improved program 
design and evaluation – a challenge we attempt to answer in this study. 
 
  In another version of the cross-country comparison, Spear identities five factors that are 
“particularly important in determining the likelihood of successful disarmament and 
demobilization.” (Spear 2002)  Specifically, the success of DDR depends, he argues, on the 
feasibility and aims of the peace agreement, the implementation environment, the capability and 
resources of the implementers, the attitudes of the warring parties, and the effective verification of 
treaty implementation.  Little effort is made however to measure success  or to examine the 
trajectory of demobilization in countries that did not receive a UN DDR program.  Without more 
systematic comparisons, we are hard pressed to say anything concrete about the factors that matter. 
 
  A final approach involves the evaluation of country-specific programs.  Here attention is 
directed toward the impact of DDR programs within a country on specific populations of ex-
combatants.  Sierra Leone’s “Tracer Study” provides a good example of this method (Stavrou et. al., 
2003).  In the Tracer Study, funded by the Multi-Donor Trust Fund, the authors use quantitative 
survey techniques to follow the post-war trajectory of a cohort of 250 ex-combatants.  Special 
attention is paid to the measurement of two dependent variables: economic and social reintegration.  
In terms of economic reintegration, the survey aimed to assess the quality and nature of employment 
found by ex-combatants after their participation in the DDR program.  Social reintegration referred 
to levels of family and community acceptance.  The Tracer Study is a model effort in terms of 
developing more systematic measures to assess the impact of DDR.  Its weakness, however, is that 
by talking to only those who participated in DDR programs (a subset of ex-combatants), we cannot 
know anything about the impact of those programs on economic and social reintegration.  
Moreover, driven by donor considerations, the authors collected few covariates that might help to 
explain progress at the individual-level, including information about how individual soldiers 
experienced the civil war.   10
 
  In reviewing the literature on the implementation of DDR, one fact is apparent: past 
attempts at evaluation have not recognized the importance of having a control group in order to 
estimate the impacts of a program.  Effective evaluation of DDR requires a data strategy that allows 
us to compare countries in which DDR was implemented with those where it was not, communities 
where programs were established with those that did not receive investments, individuals who 
participated with those who did not, or areas in which one type of DDR program was implemented 
with places where other techniques were used.   In the absence of a randomized intervention, 
researchers can still bring a comparative approach and statistical techniques to bear in an attempt to 
isolate the determinants of reintegration success and assess the impact of particular programs.  
These approaches are only second best at identifying causal patterns, but still provide valuable 
information about the relationship between interventions and outcomes.  The remainder of this 
paper describes one such attempt that uses survey research of fighters that did and did not 
participate in DDR programs in Sierra Leone. 
 
IV.  Surveying DDR in Sierra Leone 
 
  In January 2002, when the government of Sierra Leone declared its more than decade-long 
war officially over, the international community showered it with plaudits for a successful 
disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration program that paved the way for a stable post-war 
political order.  This turn of events was unexpected for a country that experienced a brutal civil war 
which captured international attention, a stop-and-start peace-building effort lasting more than four 
years, and the persistent negative spillover effects of violence in neighboring Liberia.  The stable, 
post-war period now provides an opportunity to ask three questions:  To what extent have former 
combatants reintegrated in Sierra Leone?  What are the factors that account for successful 
reintegration?  Have DDR programs and other international efforts increased the likelihood of 
successful reintegration?  Before we turn to an analysis of the data, we provide some brief 
background on the conflict, the demobilization process, and the survey itself.  
 
  The war in Sierra Leone began when a small group of combatants – calling themselves the 
Revolutionary United Front (RUF) – entered Sierra Leone from neighboring Liberia, backed by 
Charles Taylor.  Over the course of nearly ten years of fighting, Sierra Leone experienced violence of 
horrific proportions.  Tens of thousands of civilians were killed, and hundreds of thousands were 
displaced from their homes.   
 
  Soon after the war began, the national government fell to a coup, replaced by the National 
Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC), which sought to defeat the RUF by hiring a South African 
security firm (Executive Outcomes) in support for the Sierra Leone Army (SLA).  Following a 
second coup, the country returned to civilian rule in 1996, when President Kabbah and the Sierra 
Leone People’s Party were elected to power.  Kabbah sought to end the war through an abortive 
peace process in 1997 and by forging an alliance with a federation of local militia that had formed to 
fight the rebellion (the CDF).  But with the war on-going, Kabbah was quickly deposed in a coup, 
and the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) took power.  The AFRC invited the RUF 
into a power-sharing arrangement which lasted until March 1998, when Nigeria, leading a West 
African intervention force, restored Kabbah and his democratically-elected government to power.   
  
  Following Nigeria’s intervention, a fifth faction formed (the West Side Boys (WSB)), 
incorporating elements of the AFRC, RUF, and SLA, and the AFRC/RUF alliance retreated to the   11
bush, plotting a major attack on Freetown.  That attack in January 1999 caused bloodshed which 
was beamed around the world.  The warring parties were soon pressured into a peace agreement at 
Lomé, which incorporated the RUF into a power-sharing arrangement.  A UN force (UNAMSIL) 
was deployed to take the reigns from the Nigerians, but it was poorly organized.  With mistrust high, 
the treaty broke down and the RUF took hundreds of peacekeepers hostage.  With the country 
returning to violence, the British intervened and reestablished security.  Along with Guinean troops, 
the British forced the RUF into submission, substantially weakening its capacity.  Finally an effective 
presence, the UN took a leadership role in disarming and breaking down the warring factions. 
 
  Given the ups and downs of the war itself, it should come as no surprise that the DDR 
process faced innumerable hiccups in its implementation.  The first effort to demobilize soldiers 
began in 1998, with the goal of dismantling the belligerent parties, and transforming their 
organizations into political parties.  Kabbah’s government led this process after it was returned to 
power by the Nigerians.  But it was wholly unsuccessful, as fewer than 5000 ex-combatants 
registered for disarmament and demobilization.  A second phase began in 1999, after the Lomé 
Accord was signed, and it continued until 2000 when the war broke out anew.  During this period, 
slightly more than 20,000 combatants turned up to be demobilized.  The bulk of demobilization 
took place after UNAMSIL was beefed up, following the British intervention, in 2001-02.  In the 
third and final phase close to 50,000 combatants disarmed.  This brought the total caseload to nearly 
74,000 fighters.   
 
  The disarmament process was conducted at reception centers distributed around the 
country.  It included five phases: the assembly of combatants, collection of personal information, 
the verification and collection of weapons, the certification of eligibility for benefits, and 
transportation to a demobilization center.  Once disarmed, combatants were prepared to return to 
civilian life in demobilization sites where they received basic necessities, reinsertion allowances, 
counseling, and eventually transportation to a local community where they elected to live 
permanently.  In the community, combatants benefited from training programs (largely vocational 
skills including auto repair, furniture-making, etc.) designed to ease their reentry into the local 
economy.  Moving more than 70,000 soldiers through this process is from an operational standpoint 
an accomplishment in itself. 
 
  While recent analyses have conducted an institutional post-mortem of the DDR process – 
looking at how the UN operations might have been better organized, the programs better targeted, 
community ownership better obtained – they also point to serious challenges that remain in the 
reintegration process (Meek et. al. 2004).  Combatants in Sierra Leone committed widespread 
atrocities and destroyed much of the country’s infrastructure.  The challenges of gaining acceptance, 
finding employment, and accepting that the war has come to an end are often overwhelming for 
many soldiers who grew up knowing nothing other than war (Ginifer 2004).   
 
  To assess the extent to which combatants have been able to reintegrate and identify the 
relative importance of participation in the DDR program, we gathered systematic data on a sample 
of ex-combatants, some of whom participated in the formal DDR effort and others who remained 
outside of it.  The survey was conducted between June and August 2003, slightly more than a year 
after the war came to an end.  The study targeted a sample of 1000 ex-combatants; a total of 1043 
surveys of ex-combatants were completed.  The main method for gathering information was 
through the administration of a closed-ended questionnaire by an enumerator in the respondent’s   12




  To ensure as unbiased a sample as possible, the survey employed a number of levels of 
randomization.  First, teams enumerated surveys in geographic locations and chiefdoms that were 
randomly selected.  Estimates of the population of ex-combatants presently residing in the 
chiefdoms were made based on data from the National Commission on Demobilization, 
Disarmament, and Reintegration (NCDDR), the National Statistics Office, and estimates of experts 
in Sierra Leone.  The estimates of the population distribution were used to generate weights that 
were used to draw 63 clusters of 17 subjects throughout the country.  These clusters fell within 
forty-five chiefdoms or urban localities and these forty-five localities formed the basic enumeration 
unit.  The fact that the sampling frame depended in part on NCDDR estimates implies that it is 
possible that areas in which NCDDR was most inactive were under-represented in our sample.  
 
  Within each enumeration unit, sites were also randomly selected, with both urban and rural 
areas represented.  For each enumeration unit, specific numerical targets were set for the major 
factions, based on the randomization and the estimated national distribution of faction members.  
Broad goals were also provided to guide survey teams in meeting gender and age targets based on 
the estimated national share of women and children in the groups: enumerators were instructed that 
on average one in twelve individuals interviewed should be a woman, and one in nine should have 
been under the age of 16 at the end of the conflict.  Enumerators were instructed to compare actual 
numbers of children and faction members to target goals each day. 
 
  Enumerators worked through both official (UN and government) contacts and local 
community leaders to develop lists of ex-combatants.  Teams identified pools of candidates from 
more than one source: some from the town or village Chief, some from the village youth 
coordinator, some from various DDR and NCDDR skills training centers, and so on.  In every case, 
the teams aimed to identify two to three times the targeted number of potential respondents and 
then to randomly select respondents using a variety of methods.  In most instances, Chiefs and 
DDR staff asked a number of ex-combatants to meet at a public location and teams selected 
candidates randomly from that pool (by choosing every third person or selecting numbers from a 
hat).  While this method worked well, in some areas less than twice the target population was 
identified, particularly in very remote rural areas, areas with small ex-combatant populations, and 
areas with highly polarized communities.  
 
  The survey elicited a detailed profile of each of the combatants including their socio-
economic backgrounds, their experience of the war itself, their involvement in the DDR process, 
and the realities they have faced in the post-war period.  The data are rich and textured, in spite of 
its closed-ended format.  It allows for a careful analysis of the determinants of reintegration success, 
which we undertake in this paper.  But it also provides data useful for systematic examination of the 
strategies of the warring factions and the determinants of levels of violence, which are reported 
elsewhere (Humphreys and Weinstein 2005). 
                                                 
3 An obvious concern with survey work is truth telling.  Respondents may have strong incentives to misrepresent the 
facts.  With the Special Court operative in Sierra Leone during the administration of the survey, some respondents might 
have been concerned that their answers could be used as evidence for the prosecution.  In the training, a script was 
developed for enumerators to help allay these concerns.  It was also important that survey teams administered the survey 
in private, in an effort to protect people’s privacy, that anonymity was preserved throughout, and that questions of an 
incriminating nature were not asked.    13
 
V.  Empirical Strategy for Identifying Determinants of Successful Reintegration 
 
  The main dependent variable in our analysis, accepted today, is an index of the degree to which 
individuals face difficulties in gaining acceptance from their families and communities.  We created 
the index by calculating the average of respondents’ answers to two related questions in which they 
report whether they are facing problems in gaining acceptance from family members and neighbors 
in the post-war period.  This is our preferred measure of reintegration because it captures the most 
local dynamics of the reintegration process and likely has spillover consequences for the extent to 
which combatants maintain ties with their factions and embrace the democratic process. 
 
  The dependent variable is highly skewed but displays important variation.  The vast majority 
of ex-combatants report high levels of acceptance, with more than 90% facing no problems.  At the 
same time, over 6% of combatants report facing minor or major problems gaining acceptance at the 
time of the survey (more than a year after the war was declared over).
4  While our measures support 
the idea that across individuals in Sierra Leone, reintegration has proceeded with great success, the 
difficulties faced by 6% of respondents should not be underemphasized.  If our sample were entirely 
representative of the ex-combatant population, this figure of 6% would correspond to nearly 5000 
former soldiers facing significant challenges in reintegrating into civilian life.  In fact, our sample 
does not include those combatants that failed to reintegrate and elected instead to continue fighting 
in Liberia or Côte d’Ivoire.  Insofar as these migrant fighters represent a source of bias in our 
sample, the implication is that our estimate of dissatisfaction is a lower bound.  Making sense of the 
factors that explain why some individuals struggle to gain acceptance, while most find success, is the 
main task for the remainder of the paper. 
 
  Recognizing that there are multiple components of reintegration, we also explore variation in 
three additional elements of reintegration that follow from our analysis of the literature on civil war 
termination.  First, successful reintegration requires that combatants break their ties with the warring 
factions, so that previous command and control structures no longer operate in the post-war period.  
We examine a dependent variable, broken ties to faction, that captures the extent to which combatants 
still turn to faction leaders for assistance.  Second, reintegration also depends on the degree to which 
combatants gain entry to the local economy.  We explore a dependent variable, employment, which 
records the employment status of combatants.  Third, successful reintegration requires that 
combatants accept the democratic political order and view participation in elections as a realistic 
means for affecting political change.  We constructed an additional variable – believe in the democratic 
system – which represents combatants’ beliefs about the viability of affecting change through 
participation in elections.  For completeness, we also present some results on a variable, accepted 
initially, which represents the extent of difficulty individual combatants faced in gaining acceptance 
immediately when they returned to their communities.  But this variable – because it describes 
experiences of fighters before the DDR process began – is not used in our subsequent analysis of 
the impact of external programs. 
 
                                                 
4 For the empirical results presented in the paper, we use a continuous measure of our index which ranges from 0 to 1.  
Because the distribution is skewed, we also re-ran all of our results using probit models using a dummy variable 
constructed to differentiate those who face no problems from those who have encountered difficulties.  All of the 
results presented in the paper hold up with these different specifications.   14
  On each of these dimensions, while most combatants are returning to civilian life, there 
remains significant cause for concern.  More than 12% of former fighters report having no work at 
all; a broader definition of unemployment which recognizes the underemployment of individuals 
cultivating land for subsistence purposes, would record a much higher number.  21% of combatants 
still turn to their faction leaders for assistance in the post-war period.  Nearly 30% of ex-combatants 
do not believe the democratic system is a viable means for affecting change in Sierra Leone.  Yet, as 
Table 1 indicates, these distinct aspects of reintegration do not appear to be highly correlated and can 
be treated as capturing different aspects of reintegration success.  Different factors are likely 




    In our empirical analysis, we distinguish between the characteristics of individual fighters, 
the factions in which they fought, and the communities in which they elected to reintegrate on the 
one hand, and the impact of programs that were implemented explicitly, by the government of Sierra 
Leone and the international community, in order to ease reintegration.   
 
Individual, Group, and Community Characteristics 
 
  Individual background characteristics relevant to prospects for reintegration include a number of 
socio-economic variables such as an individual’s age, ethnic group membership, gender, his or her 
income, and the highest level of education he or she has attained.  In addition, we include measures 
reflective of an individual’s personal experience of the war including whether he was abducted into a 
faction, whether he joined because he supported the political causes of the faction, and whether he 
served as an officer.  Each of these individual background characteristics is measured using a single 
question administered during the survey.   
 
  It may also be the case that the characteristics of an individual’s unit or faction matter for the 
likelihood of successful reintegration.  Substantial differences exist in Sierra Leone across the 
fighting factions, and within them, in terms of their make-up, structure of command and control, 
and strategies employed during the war (Humphreys and Weinstein 2005).  For the purposes of this 
analysis, we focus on one key group characteristic that is likely to affect an individual’s prospects in 
the post-war period: the impact of fighting with a unit that was highly abusive toward civilian 
populations.  To the extent that individuals committed heinous crimes against non-combatants, one 
might expect that they would face a more difficult process of gaining acceptance by community 
members and resettling into a non-military way of life.  We constructed a variable that describes the 
abusiveness of the unit in which an individual fought, by using answers to eight-related questions 
given by respondents who fought in the same chiefdom, for the same faction, during the same 
period of the war.  The weights derived from a factor analysis were then used to create a single 
measure, the extent of civilian abuse, which ranges from 0 to 1.
5    
                                                 
5 The measures used to construct the index include three distinct types of questions.  First, we include questions that 
assess the likelihood that an individual in a fighting unit would be punished for stealing, amputating, and raping a civilian 
if these were done without the expressed order of a commander.  Consequently, the responses capture levels of abuse or 
indiscipline not ordered by superiors and hence the extent to which the fighters operated in an environment that was 
permissive of abuse.   Second, we add questions about the ways in which food was collected, including whether food 
was taken forcibly or through more contractual arrangements from civilians.  Finally, the index includes the respondents’ 
evaluation of actions undertaken by the group for the benefit of civilian populations, including educational and 
ideological training.  The three components of the index combine negative sanctions (violence, forcible food collection)   15
 
  Importantly, our proxy for civilian abuse is not a measure of actual violence committed by 
fighters during the war.  Instead, it captures the strategies and behaviors of the warring factions as 
reported by the perpetrators – something likely to be correlated with actual levels of abuse.  In 
particular, the structure of the survey instrument asked respondents whether a combatant would be 
punished for certain actions if they were committed without the expressed order of a commander.  
Consequently, the responses capture levels of abuse or indiscipline not ordered, but nonetheless 
permitted, by superiors.  Of course, one can imagine a warring group in which all violence against 
non-combatants is expressly ordered by the commanding officers, but no other violence is 
permitted.  However, we assume that a group’s likelihood of allowing violence that follows from 
indiscipline (ie. without the order of a commander) is closely correlated with a more general 
permissive environment for the abuse of non-combatants. 
 
  We employ three measures that capture the characteristics of the communities into which 
combatants have reintegrated.  First, we create a measure of district wealth using data from the 
Sierra Leone Central Statistics Office.  The index – which ranges from 0 to 1 – uses factor analysis 
to combine measures of typical (imputed) rent payments in each district and an index of food 
poverty.  Both use information gathered just as the war came to an end, but before the survey was 
completed.  We also generate data on the percentage of soldiers in a chiefdom that went through the 
formal demobilization process – an effort to capture potential spillover effects from participation in 
DDR.   
 
  Third, we develop a measure of how host communities experienced the war.  A number of 
our respondents highlighted how membership in a faction affected their experience in the post-war 
period not because of their personal characteristics, but because of the reputation of the faction in 
the area where they lived.  As one respondent complained, “People cast all sorts of blame on me for 
being an ex-RUF.  They say we destroyed lives and property.  They provoke me.  I am not happy 
about my life.  People talk about me.”   
 
To estimate these effects, we calculate a measure of community suffering.  This variable 
captures the average level of abusiveness of combatants who were operational, during the course of 
the war, in each of the chiefdoms.  In computing these averages, we utilize the index of abusiveness 
for all fighters who declared themselves active in a chiefdom at any time during the war (even if 




  We also focus on the interventions mounted by the international community to improve the 
prospects for reintegration.  First, we capture whether an individual participated in the formal 
demobilization process.  89% of our sample joined the DDR program, while 11% elected to 
reintegrate on their own.  This estimate fits with the Sierra Leone government’s assessment that 
slightly more than 7000 of 79,000 total combatants, did not join the DDR program (NCDDR 2002).   
  
                                                                                                                                                             
and positive benefits (security, education) to create an aggregate measure of the extent of civilian abuse.  In some cases, 
the logics that influence the use of force and the provision of public goods may be different.  However, results in 
previous work with this variable are robust to more finely disaggregated indicators, including one that measures only 
abusive and violent tactics.  For more information on this measure, see Humphreys and Weinstein (2005).   16
  In addition to these measures we include a variable that indicates whether chiefdoms had a 
Stop-Gap program – an investment in local public works provided by the UN as the demobilization 
process unfolded, with the specific purpose of easing reintegration.  Finally, we include measures of 
the UN troop presence in each chiefdom.  The primary role of these forces was to maintain security.  
In doing so, they limited the freedom of action of ex-combatants, but also contributed to a 
resolution of the security dilemma that might have made it difficult for communities to accept 
combatants.  Data for this measure was provided by UNAMSIL forces and records official 
deployment. 
 
VI.  Individual, Group, and Community Characteristics: Analysis and Results 
 
  Table 2 presents a first cut at evaluating the effects of the explanatory variables on whether 
individuals have been accepted by their family and communities.  We provide the results of bivariate 
regressions on each of the explanatory variables.  In addition, the table includes a tougher test of 
each relationship – regressions with controls added for average faction-specific effects.  If we are to 
be confident of the independent effect of the explanatory variables, they should survive in 
regressions that account for the unobserved features of membership in a particular faction that 




  A number of individual background characteristics emerge as significant correlates of 
acceptance, even after controlling for faction fixed effects.  In particular, the ethnic group 
membership of the individual is strongly associated with different patterns of post-war reintegration.  
Members of the Mende ethnic group – more strongly associated with the CDF faction and the 
current ruling government – exhibit higher levels of acceptance.  Members of the Temne ethnic 
group – more strongly associated with the RUF and AFRC – face more difficulties.
6  And 
importantly, these ethnic effects survive the inclusion of faction fixed effects, suggesting that they 
may help to explain patterns of reintegration within groups as well.  In addition, combatants from 
the poorest backgrounds – measured by the materials with which the walls of their home before the 
war were constructed – also appear to have an easier time gaining acceptance.   
 
  We find, however, weak or no support for a number of characteristics thought to matter in 
the reintegration process including age and the gender of combatants.  The bivariate relationship 
suggests a strong link between age and reintegration success, with younger participants likely to have 
greater problems in reintegrating.  We cannot, however, distinguish the effects of length of time within 
the units and age, as these two measures are too highly correlated.  The relationship between age and 
acceptance, however, is no longer significant at conventional levels once we take account of fixed 
effects.
7  We find no relationship between gender and success in either the simple bivariate or the 
fixed effects bivariate analyses. 
                                                 
6 Although the conventional wisdom is that the CDF was a group of Mende and the RUF composed of Temne, our own 
survey results suggest that the ethnic differences between groups are vastly overstated.  Indeed, the ethnic make-up of 
the factions is almost identical.  What differs is the extent to which sub-units of the faction were ethnically homogenous 
or heterogeneous.  The CDF was composed of largely homogenous units – Mende in the South and Temne in the 
North and East – while the RUF had largely heterogeneous units in all regions. 
7 This finding should be interpreted with caution.  Human subjects concerns prevented us from interviewing soldiers 
who were children at the end of the fighting.  Nonetheless, our sample includes a substantial proportion of individuals 
who joined the factions as children and were over 18 when the war came to an end.   17
 
  Three other individual characteristics, related to how individuals experienced the war, also 
appear to impact the degree of acceptance.  There is a strong negative relationship between whether 
an individual was abducted and his or her progress in gaining acceptance.  But this result disappears 
when controls for factions are included, reflecting the fact that abduction was largely a characteristic 
of RUF fighters, and not of members of the other groups.  If individuals joined because they 
supported the cause of the group, however, they face more difficulty gaining acceptance in the post-
war period.  Strong believers or ideologues, across factions, have a harder time readjusting to civilian 
life.  Similarly, officers in the various military factions encounter more problems in gaining 
acceptance from family and neighbors.    
 
  The bivariate results are more striking when it comes to group characteristics.  Controlling 
for faction-level fixed effects, the level of abusiveness of an individual’s unit is strongly and 
negatively associated with successful reintegration.  Individuals from non-abusive units exhibit 
reintegration success levels nearly one standard deviation higher than those from highly abusive 
units.  The size of the coefficient is large relative to most other bivariate relationship and accounts 
for about 9% of total variation in acceptance (with and without fixed effects).   
 
  Two characteristics of the community in which a combatant resettles appear to matter as 
well.  Individuals who settle in wealthier locations face more difficulty reintegrating.  The effect, 
though significant in the fixed effects model, is substantively small; a one standard deviation change 
in the district wealth index, is associated with a change in reintegration success on the order of less 
than one-tenth of a standard deviation.  Second, we find that the degree of abuse of local 
communities during the war is powerfully related to the level of acceptance of ex-combatants.  This 
effect accounts for 6% of the total variation in acceptance in the pooled model.  
 
  Finally, in bivariate regressions, variables measuring intervention exhibit weak or mixed 
relationships to levels of acceptance.  Participation in the DDR program is empirically unrelated to 
reintegration.  The presence of a public works program is associated with better prospects for 
reintegration, although the effect is small and only weakly significant.  The presence of UN troops 
appears related to greater difficulties for ex-combatants in gaining acceptance. 
 
  The most important test of these explanatory variables involves evaluating their effects after 
controlling for a host of confounding factors.  Table 3 presents multivariate regression results in 
which the impact of personal, group, and community characteristics are estimated simultaneously, 




  Column 1 reports the results for our preferred dependent variable – whether individuals are 
accepted today by family and community.  The most important finding is the statistically strong 
relationship between the abusiveness of an individual’s unit and his or her prospects for 
reintegration.  The coefficient is more than twice as large as any other.  Controlling for the factions 
in which individuals fought, those who participated in units that perpetrated high levels of abuse 
face significant hurdles in gaining acceptance.  This may be the result of a community’s awareness of 
the crimes perpetrated by particular individuals or their units; it might also be the case that 
individuals in abusive units were the most ‘hard-core’ fighters and have faced difficulty accepting the   18
end of the conflict.
8  It appears, however, to be independent of the suffering of the communities in 
which an ex-combatant settles – an effect which weakens substantially once a combatant’s 
experience of abuse is accounted for.
9 
 
  One other individual characteristic emerges as significant in the multivariate model, although 
the relative size of its coefficient is small.  Individuals who described joining a faction because they 
supported its political goals face a more difficult time gaining acceptance from their families and 
communities.  This may reflect a gap between the periods of fighting – in which factions were 
extremely powerful – and a new political reality in which the warring parties have been largely 
discredited.  Strong supporters and ideologues may face an uphill battle in accepting the terms of the 
post-war period.    
 
  Interestingly, the inclusion of faction fixed effects in column one only marginally improves 
the explanatory power of the model, suggesting that while significant, these fixed effects are not 
markedly increasing our ability to explain variation in levels of acceptance.  It is clear that much of 
the variation goes unexplained.  This is likely the result of the significant clustering of observations 
at very high levels of reintegration success.  The model is likely doing little to help us understand 
why some individuals score a 0.96 and others score a 0.98 on our index of acceptance.   
 
  Table 3 also reports the results of our core model, employing variations on the dependent 
variable.  Our goal here is to explore whether there is an underlying set of factors that impact 
reintegration more generally, or whether different factors matter for different aspects of 
reintegration.  Columns 2-5 report the results for four distinct dependent variables: whether an 
individual was accepted by family and community initially after the war ended, whether the 
individual found employment, whether he or she has broken ties to the faction, and whether the 




  The results suggest that different causal processes may be at work for different aspects and 
periods of reintegration.  Consider first the impact of the abusiveness of an individual’s unit.  
Abusiveness has a strong negative impact on the degree to which an individual is accepted by family 
and community members, initially after the war and one year later when the survey was conducted.
10  
But it is unrelated to the likelihood of an individual finding employment.  Moreover, it has a slightly 
positive relationship with the likelihood that an individual has broken ties to his or her faction.  A 
plausible interpretation treats these seemingly contradictory results as evidence for the alienation of a 
                                                 
8 We ran an additional robustness check, employing a variation in the measure of abusiveness.  For each individual, we 
recalculated his/her unit’s score for abusiveness based only on the responses of others who served in the same chiefdom 
and faction at the same point in time.  In doing so, we sought to check for the possibility that certain types of individuals 
are more sensitive to or otherwise more willing to report social pathologies, including whether their unit was abusive and 
whether they are facing difficulty gaining acceptance.  This new measure of abusiveness, while strongly significant, is 
weaker in size than the original measure in the bivariate regressions.  It does, however, disappear in fixed effects and 
multivariate models.        
9 The impact of community suffering is on the margin of significance at conventional levels in the specification reported 
here.  Results on this variable are not robust to the inclusion and exclusion of other right-hand side variables. 
10 Our measure of abusiveness is particularly important right after the war ended, and its effect (although strong and 
significant) seems to diminish over time.  One might realistically ask whether the challenges individuals face in gaining 
acceptance may simply continue to decrease over time as the violence recedes into memory.  Further research will be 
needed to answer this question.   19
certain population of ex-fighters who, owing to their experience of the war, have rejected their 
factions in the post-war period, yet failed to find acceptance in the communities in which they have 
resettled.  The results on our measure of political support further underscore this interpretation – 
strong supporters have broken from their factions, but fail to gain acceptance in their new 
environments.   
 
  Employment prospects seem to follow a logic of their own.
11  Combatants who resettled in 
wealthier districts have more difficulty finding employment.  This may reflect the large population of 
urban unemployed in Freetown and the difficulty of finding consistent work in the wealthy 
diamond-mining districts which have come under increasing control since the end of the fighting.  
Education levels are also significant explanatory variables for finding employment, although they 
work in an opposite direction.  Controlling for all other factors, those with more than a primary 
school education are four percentage points less likely to find employment. 
  
  It also appears that whether individuals accept the democratic process is driven by a distinct 
set of factors.  People who experience more difficult economic circumstances – either because they 
lack education or income – are more likely to accept the democratic process and believe in its 
viability.  This is good news as poor and uneducated combatants represented the vast majority of 
fighters in the war.  Members of the Temne ethnic group also exhibit significantly more faith in the 
democratic process – a positive sign given the purported Mende bias of the ruling Sierra Leone 
People’s Party (SLPP).  This might be reflective of a strong desire on the part of Temne to forge a 
peaceful existence in the post-war environment.  Similarly, those who were strong supporters of 
various factions exhibit stronger beliefs in the democratic system.  This embrace of democracy by 
those who were true believers during the war may be endogenous to the difficulties they have faced 
in gaining acceptance from their families and communities.  Encountering significant hurdles to 
reintegration, strong supporters may be adjusting their behavior to be more accommodating of the 
post-war order to gain greater acceptance. 
  
VII.  Program Effects: Analysis and Results 
 
  We examine three forms of intervention mounted by external actors to ease the 
demobilization and reintegration of former fighters, and to prevent a recurrence of fighting: the 
establishment of formal DDR programs, investments in public works projects, and the maintenance 
of security through high levels of foreign troop presence.  In this section, we focus exclusively on 
our preferred dependent variable – the degree to which individuals still struggle to gain acceptance 




  Table 4 presents results from a model that examines the effects of intervention controlling 
for all factors included in the previous specifications.  Evidence from Sierra Leone does not support 
the hypothesis that participation in a DDR program increases the degree to which combatants are 
                                                 
11 The employment variable is coded based on a question about the respondent’s occupation, rather than whether 
individuals have a job.  When asked about their occupation, only 12.5% indicate that they have no employment 
whatsoever.  23% report farming as their primary occupation; 16% are artisans; approximately 5% are traders.  If one 
asked most of these individuals whether they have a “job”, they would say no.  Insofar as jobs are thought of as formal 
sector occupations, a broader definition of unemployment than the one we use – to include those in the informal sector 
and the underemployed – might yield substantially different results.   20
accepted by their families and communities.  There are no statistically significant differences 
between reintegration success across those combatants that participated and those that did not 
participate in formal demobilization programs.  Moreover, it does not appear that participation in 
DDR programs reduces the impact of being from an abusive group on the prospects for acceptance.  
This non-result on DDR participation is important and deserves further discussion.  In interpreting 
it as evidence that the DDR process had no effect at the individual-level, we face two challenges:  
selection effects and spillover effects.  
 
  The first is that a real effect may exist but be obscured by selection effects.  In particular, the 
population of combatants who participate in DDR may be systematically different from those who 
elected to reintegrate without external assistance.  It may be that DDR took on the very difficult 
cases – such as members of the RUF – while individuals who fought with the CDF (which was 
widely seen as victorious in the conflict) decided to return home on their own.  These differences if 
unobserved and not controlled for in our models might explain the non-result. 
 
  There are statistical approaches we can employ to look for this effect.  An optimal approach 
is to employ an instrument, but finding a variable that explains participation but is otherwise 
unrelated to reintegration success is difficult.
12  We concentrate here on another approach: 
controlling for selection variables, using propensity matching estimators.  We take a first cut at 
looking for differences across those who joined DDR and those who did not by comparing 




  The most striking finding is that there are no real differences in participation rates across the 
major factions.  If the DDR program was taking on the hardest cases, we would have expected to 
find CDF combatants enrolling in DDR programs at a much lower rate than the AFRC/RUF.  
There is no evidence to support that argument.  At the same time, it appears that members of the 
Temne ethnic group do enroll in DDR at higher rates, and the analysis in previous sections has 
suggested that Temne do face a more difficult path to reintegration.  The strongest finding is that 
people from the Southern region participate at much lower rates – a full 22 percentage points.  So if 
individuals from the South have an ex-ante easier time reintegrating and DDR focused on those in 




                                                 
12 To employ instrumental variables estimation, we constructed an instrument based on the distance between where an 
individual fought in the closing stages of the war and the closest DDR site.  This instrument is plausibly related to 
whether an individual joined DDR, in terms of the costs of moving oneself to a DDR site.  We constructed a second 
instrument that records the distance between the nearest DDR site and an ex-combatant’s pre-conflict home.  While it is 
plausible that remoteness is not otherwise related to acceptance, one could imagine arguments that suggest a violation of 
the exclusion restriction for this instrument.  Our results using both of these instruments, not reported here, are 
disappointing.  The first stage of the instrument is, in both cases, extremely weak.  The use of an instrument thus does 
not provide new evidence supporting a link between DDR and the successful reintegration of individuals into their 
families and communities.  
13 We also checked to see whether the abusiveness of an individual’s unit varied in systematic ways between those who 
joined DDR and those who did not.  Although there is a small difference, it is not statistically significant at conventional 
levels.  There were also no statistically significant differences in the degree of initial acceptance between those who 
joined DDR and those who did not.   21
  But these factors are observable differences across individuals that we can control for in 
multivariate regressions.  Including controls for ethnic group membership, faction, and region does 
not seem to change the general finding.  Still participation in DDR does not seem to be associated 
with higher levels of reintegration success.   
 
  This finding is supported by results from propensity matching estimators using these same 
determinants of selection into the DDR programs.  Propensity matching indicators estimate, for 
each individual, a probability of entering DDR based on all relevant available data.  Based on these 
probabilities, the method matches pairs of individuals that have the same estimated propensity of 
joining, but one of whom did and the other of whom did not join.  If our estimates for the 
propensity of joining are accurate, then for any pair matched in this way, we can treat the difference 
in reintegration success for those that do join DDR and those that do not, as a result of the fact of 
joining.  
 
We employ this technique on our sample of respondents, using as predictors of joining 
DDR the age, gender, wealth, educational attainment, factional affiliation, and their location in 2000 
at the end of the war.  Together these account for just 7% in the variation in affiliation with DDR. 
Among this sample for which we have full data on all of these determinants (947 observations), 
those that went to DDR recorded an average reintegration score of .96, those that did not go also 
had an average reintegration score of .96, with the difference between the two groups being zero. 
After matching observations based on propensity scores, the difference is still zero.  This finding is 
robust to variation in our measures of reintegration. 
 
  The second challenge to the no-impact interpretation of our result focuses on spillover 
effects. Plausibly DDR programs impact non-participants as well as participants.  Arguably, the fact 
that close to 90% of combatants did participate may generate positive spillovers in communities that 
ease the reintegration of others.  We test explicitly for these positive spillover effects and find no 
evidence in support of this hypothesis.  The results in Table 4 on the percent of soldiers 
demobilized in a given community, suggest that positive spillovers do not seem to impact the level 
of acceptance. 
 
  Turning to public works programs, the data do not suggest that individuals in chiefdoms that 
benefited from public works programs found greater acceptance than those in chiefdoms without 
Stop Gap projects.  As with participation in DDR, this non-result should be interpreted with 
caution.  UN-funded public works programs may have been initiated in the communities facing 
more difficult challenges in reintegration, offering one possible explanation for the non-finding.
14  At 
a minimum, our results suggest that if this was the case, the beneficial effects of these programs 
were not sufficient to overcome the initial adverse conditions.   
 
  Finally, the data suggest that, controlling for other factors, the presence of UN troops is not 
empirically related to an individual’s prospects for gaining acceptance.  Moreover, the evidence 
suggests that the presence of UN troops is actually negatively related to the prospect of acceptance 
for RUF combatants – suggesting an adverse effect.  Given the history of difficult relations between 
the UN and the RUF, in particular, one could put forth a plausible causal story explaining this 
                                                 
14 Using our measure of the difficulty combatants faced immediately at the cessation of hostilities, however, we find no 
evidence for a selection effect in Stop Gap programs.  It does not appear that these programs were implemented in 
places where combatants faced early difficulties reintegrating.   22
relationship.  But again, it is possible that UN troops were assigned to especially difficult areas with 
high concentrations of RUF fighters where gaining acceptance, ex-ante, was likely to be difficult.
15   
 
  In summary, while selection effects make interpreting many of these results difficult, there is 
no strong relationship between the various external programs mounted by the international 
community and the degree to which ex-combatants have gained acceptance in Sierra Leone.  While 
external intervention may be having an effect at the macro-level – as evidenced by the skewed 
distribution of our dependent variables – we cannot identify these effects at the micro-level.  
 
VIII.  Conclusion 
 
  With the growing involvement of external actors in post-conflict situations, increasing 
attention is being dedicated to the challenges of peace-building.  The disarmament, demobilization, 
and reintegration of combatants is a central component of efforts to reestablish legitimate 
governance and prevent the recurrence of conflict.  The demobilization of competing factions sends 
credible signals of the intent of factions to commit to a peace process and programs that support 
reciprocal demobilization can aid in the management of spoilers and increase the stake of former 
fighters in the post-war political and economic order. 
 
  In spite of nearly a decade of involvement in demobilizing warring factions, there is little 
evidence about the factors that explain whether individuals can successfully reintegrate after conflict 
and the precise causal impact of externally-funded programs to reintegrate combatants.  Instead, the 
scant literature on demobilization has focused attention on details of program design and 
implementation in an effort to come to grips with the challenges that practitioners have faced on the 
ground. 
 
  This paper charts a new course for research on post-conflict reintegration and international 
efforts to demobilize and reintegrate combatants.  In particular, it proposes shifting the analysis 
from the macro to the micro.  To design effective DDR programs that contribute to peace-building, 
we need rigorous research on the factors that explain whether combatants reject their factional 
affiliations, reintegrate into the community and the economy, and embrace the post-war political 
order.  We present the results of a large-N survey of combatants in Sierra Leone which allowed us to 
track the progress of DDR participants and non-participants in the post-war period. 
 
  The findings provide insights useful to practitioners of post-conflict reconstruction.  
Specifically, the growing chorus in support of specially targeted programs to help female combatants 
and those recruited as children appears to rest on shaky empirical ground.  At least in Sierra Leone, 
women and young combatants face no more difficulty reintegrating once other potential factors are 
taken into account.  Again, this finding should be interpreted with caution, as no data was gathered 
from combatants who were still children when the survey was enumerated. 
 
  Whether individual combatants gain acceptance, the evidence suggests, is also not directly 
related to the socio-economic characteristics of former fighters.  But individual level factors do 
                                                 
15 Further work is required to investigate the selection mechanisms for the distribution of UN troops.  Preliminary 
empirical analysis suggests that the three most important factors that explain where UN troops go in Sierra Leone are 
population size of the chiefdom, size of the combatant population, and the existence of diamonds.  Together, these 
account for 60% of the variation in troop presence.   23
matter. A combatant’s experience of the war – in particular, the extent to which he or she engaged in 
abusive practices – is the most important determinant of acceptance.  Individuals who perpetrated 
widespread human rights abuses face significant difficulty in gaining acceptance from their families 
and communities after the war.   
 
  Perhaps the most surprising result is that we find no evidence that UN operations were 
instrumental in facilitating DDR at the individual level and we find some evidence of adverse effects.  
Non-participants in DDR do just as well as those who entered the formal demobilization program.  
We find no evidence that UN troop presence helps resolve community security dilemmas, and find 
that if anything, UN troops are associated with greater difficulties.   
 
  Without a complete handle on selection effects in the employment of interventions, these 
negative results should be treated with caution.  These results may suggest that other factors – 
measurable only at the country-level – may be far more important for determining the path of 
reintegration.  In particular, the fact that the war in Sierra Leone ended decisively, with a major 
military intervention by the British, may be consequential for the high rates of reintegration success 
both among soldiers formally demobilized and those who returned home on their own.  At a 
minimum, however, they suggest that if there were positive effects at the individual level, they were 
not great enough to overcome the selection effects.   
 
  This poses a challenge for political scientists working to explain the determinants of 
successful peacebuilding.  The factors that matter for successful reintegration in Sierra Leone seem 
to operate at the level of the individual combatant—notably his or her experience in the war—as 
well as through the mechanisms identified by political scientists as being important for war 
termination.  While high levels of reintegration success can plausibly be linked to the presence of 
external actors, as Walter’s work might suggest, macro-level theories make no predictions about the 
individual-level attributes that correlate with an individual’s post-war prospects.  If spoilers represent 
as serious a threat to conflict resolution as Stedman suggests, our research points to the need for 
more serious theorizing and empirical attention to the micro-level processes that underpin post-
conflict reconstruction. 
 
  There is also a very clear lesson here for practitioners: to discount the prima facie evidence 
presented here that external interventions have no effect - or even an adverse effect – the design of 
DDR programs must employ methodologies that can account for selection effects that operate at 
the level of the individual directly.  The best approach involves the development of monitoring and 
evaluation systems that employ some degree of randomized intervention.    24
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0.64     
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-0.05 -0.09 -0.05   
Believe in the 
democratic 
system? 
-0.02 -0.05 0.00 -0.07   26
Table 2: Determinants of Acceptance: Bivariate Relationships With and Without Fixed 
Effects  
 
Individual Characteristics  Group Characteristics 
Variable Coefficient  t-statistic  N  R2 Model Variable  Coefficient t-statistic N  R2 Model 
Age 0.001  [2.72]  ***  1018  0.01  OLS Abusiveness -0.154 [4.56]***  1004 0.09  OLS 
 0.000  [1.26]  1017  0.05  FE    -0.162 [3.15]***  1003 0.09  FE 
Mende 0.016  [2.04]**  1022  0.01  OLS           
 0.019  [2.60]  **  1021  0.05  FE  Community Characteristics 
Temne -0.025  [3.22]***  1022  0.01  OLS Variable Coefficient t-statistic  N  R2 Model 
 -0.022  [3.33]***  1021  0.05  FE  District -0.021  [1.14]  1022 0.00 OLS 
Female -0.030  [1.54]  1014 0.01  OLS Wealth -0.037 [2.09]**  1021 0.06  FE 
 -0.007  [0.36]  1013  0.05  FE  %  Chiefdom 0.023 [0.74] 1022 0.00  OLS 
Educated -0.011 [1.65] 1022 0.00  OLS Demobilized 0.032 [1.11]  1021 0.05 FE 
 -0.010  [1.38]  1021  0.05  FE  Community -0.191 [4.54]***  1020 0.05  OLS 
Poor 0.016  [3.55]***  1021  0.01 OLS Suffering -0.137 [3.14]***  1019 0.06  FE 
 0.012  [2.36]**  1020  0.05  FE            
Abducted -0.031  [3.06]***  1022 0.02  OLS  
 0.026  [1.09]  1021  0.05  FE  Interventions 
Political Support  0.011  [1.77]* 1022 0.00  OLS Variable  Coefficient t-statistic  N R2 Model 
 -0.015  [2.35]**  1021  0.05  FE  DDR 0.000 [0.05]  1019 0.00  OLS 
Officer  -0.033 [1.77]* 1022 0.01  OLS  0.001  [0.16]  1018 0.05  FE 
  -0.029 [1.73]* 1021 0.05  FE  Stop 0.015  [1.29]  1022 0.00  OLS 
           Gap  0.021  [1.80]*  1021 0.05  FE 
           UN  Troops -0.019  [3.90]***  1003 0.04  OLS 
             -0.016  [3.26]***  1002 0.07  FE 
 
Notes: Each row in this table presents the results of a bivariate regression.  The dependent variable is accepted today.  All 
regressions allow errors to be clustered geographically.  For each independent variable, we report results for both OLS 
and fixed effects models (with fixed effects for factions). 
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Table 3: Multivariate Results with Clustering by Chiefdom 
 





Employment?  Broken ties to 
faction? 




Age 0.000  0.001  0.000  0.003  -0.001 
 [0.83]  [1.81]*  [0.43]  [1.41]  [0.95] 
Female -0.006  -0.016 -0.047  0.035  0.025 
 [0.38]  [0.50]  [0.93]  [0.67]  [0.47] 
Temne -0.012  -0.036  0.005  0.105  0.135 
 [1.33]  [2.27]**  [0.15]  [2.44]**  [3.16]*** 
Educated -0.004  -0.016 -0.037  0.053 -0.062 
 [0.72]  [1.22]  [1.96]*  [1.93]*  [2.31]** 
Poor 0.004  0.005  0.007 0.006 0.101 
 [0.56]  [0.32]  [0.34]  [0.21]  [2.58]*** 
Abducted 0.027  0.050 -0.032 0.034 0.004 
 [1.10]  [1.55]  [0.77]  [0.56]  [0.07] 
Political Support  -0.008 -0.016  0.008  0.123  0.086 
 [2.87]***  [1.73]*  [0.48]  [3.02]***  [1.96]* 
Officer -0.021  -0.028  -0.042  -0.029  -0.069 
 [1.41]  [1.21]  [1.06]  [0.56]  [1.36] 
Abusiveness -0.131  -0.435 0.043  0.249 0.155 
 [2.44]**  [4.69]***  [0.77]  [1.91]*  [1.54] 
District Wealth  -0.023 -0.022 -0.060  0.054  0.130 
 [1.53]  [0.86]  [1.89]*  [1.09]  [1.76]* 
Community Suffering  -0.056 -0.035 -0.280  0.183  -0.260 
 [1.44]  [0.58]  [3.16]***  [1.04]  [1.63] 
Constant 1.044  1.024       
 [30.46]***  [17.91]***       
Observations 990  995  1005  967  974 
Pseudo R-squared  0.11 0.22 0.06  0.07 0.05 
 
Note: *significant at 10%. **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%.  Robust z-statistics or t-statistics in brackets. 
Columns 1 and 2 report multivariate regression models.  Columns 3-5 reports the results of probit estimation with 
marginal coefficient estimates (at mean values for the explanatory variables).  Faction fixed effects are included in all 
specifications.  All models allow errors to be clustered geographically at the chiefdom level. 
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Table 4: Impact of Interventions on Reintegration 
 
 (1) 
 Accepted  today? 
DDR Participant  -0.007 
 [0.87] 
Abusiveness*DDR Participant  0.003 
 [0.04] 




UN Troops  0.002 
 [1.06] 







Note: *significant at 10%. **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%.  Robust z-statistics or t-statistics in brackets. Column 
1 reports multivariate regression models.  Faction fixed effects are included and the model allows errors to be clustered 
geographically at the chiefdom level.  Additional controls include all variables in previous multivariate models (Table 3). 
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Table 5: Rates of Participation in DDR  
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Notes: Column 4 reports the p-value of a test of the null hypothesis that the participation rates are equal across the two categories. 
*significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; significant at 1%.   30
Appendix: Summary Statistics 
 
Variable N  Mean  SD  Min  Max 
Accepted today?  1022  0.98  0.11  0  1 
Accepted initially? 1028  0.92  0.22  0  1 
Employment? 1039  0.87  0.33  0  1 
Broken ties to faction?  1007  0.79  0.41  0  1 
Believe in democratic system? 1006  0.72  0.45  0  1 
Age 992  24.49  10.03  3  73 
Female 1037  1.11  0.31  1  2 
Temne 1045  0.20  0.40  0  1 
Abducted 1045  0.36  0.48  0  1 
Political Support  1045  0.39  0.49  0  1 
Educated 1045  0.41  0.49  0  1 
Poor 1042  0.68  0.47  0  1 
Officer 1045  0.09  0.29  0  1 
Abusiveness 1026  0.20  0.21  0  1 
District Wealth  948  0.17  0.26  0  1 
Community  Suffering 1503 0.20 0.11 0.13 0.89 
 
 
 
 